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A B S T R A C T
Disgust sensitivity predicts judgments of moral issues, especially when they concern transgressions of the purity
domain. The reason for this domain-specific relationship is unclear. One potential explanation is that measures
of disgust sensitivity and purity transgressions share an important characteristic: They are weird. We test this
“weirdness overlap” hypothesis by examining whether weirdness of disgust sensitivity items relates to purity
moral judgments (total N=805). Weirder disgust sensitivity items were more strongly associated with moral
judgments of purity, but not care, transgressions, suggesting support for the weirdness overlap hypothesis.
However, the implications of this finding are limited as we find that eliminating the weirdest items from disgust
sensitivity measures does not affect the tendency for the association between disgust sensitivity and moral
judgments to be especially pronounced for purity transgressions. Although weirdness of disgust sensitivity items
is associated with the disgust sensitivity-purity link, it cannot explain why disgust sensitivity is more strongly
related to moral judgments of purity transgressions.
1. Introduction
Disgust sensitivity influences moral decision-making (e.g.,
Laakasuo, Sundvall, & Drosinou, 2017; Van Leeuwen, Dukes, Tybur, &
Park, 2017). The relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral
issues is especially pronounced for moral transgressions of the purity
domain (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Wagemans, Brandt, &
Zeelenberg, 2018). While this disgust-purity link is established, it is not
yet clear what psychological mechanism can account for the domain-
specific relationship. Some argue that the relative weirdness of trans-
gressions representing the purity domain plays a role (Gray & Keeney,
2015), but previous research investigating this possibility has focused
solely on the weirdness of moral transgressions (Wagemans, Brandt, &
Zeelenberg, 2017). In the current paper, we flip the perspective and test
a “weirdness overlap” hypothesis: Can weirdness of disgust sensitivity
items predict their relationship to moral judgments of purity (i.e.,
weird) transgressions?
While disgust is thought to have evolved to protect us against dis-
eases by distinguishing harmless from toxic foods, it has extended to
moral contexts (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Rozin,
Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius,
2009). One recurring finding is that individual differences in disgust
sensitivity predict opposition to moral and political issues, including
homosexuality, abortion, and euthanasia (Crawford, Inbar, & Maloney,
2014; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom,
2009; Jarudi, 2009; Olatunji, 2008; Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, &
Hibbing, 2011; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010). This relationship be-
tween disgust sensitivity and the moral domain is especially strong for
acts violating a purity norm, with studies (Horberg et al., 2009), in-
cluding pre-registered studies (Wagemans et al., 2018), showing a
stronger relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments
of purity transgressions than moral judgments of transgressions of any
other moral domain (i.e., care, authority, fairness, loyalty, and liberty).
1.1. Weirdness overlap hypothesis
What psychological mechanism can account for the disgust sensi-
tivity-purity association? The “weirdness overlap” hypothesis is one
potential explanation and involves the relative weirdness of purity
transgressions. Gray and Keeney (2015) argued that a sampling bias of
the moral domain resulted in purity transgressions (e.g., “Someone
signs a piece of paper that says: I hereby sell my soul, after my death, to
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whoever has this piece of paper”) that are substantially weirder than
transgressions representing other moral domains (e.g., care: “Someone
shoots and kills an animal that is a member of an endangered species”).
While empirical studies do confirm that purity transgressions are per-
ceived to be weirder than other types of transgressions, they either do
not test (Gray & Keeney, 2015) or do not find (Wagemans et al., 2017)
that transgression weirdness explains why disgust sensitivity is more
strongly related to purity moral judgments.
However, perceived weirdness might not only be relevant for moral
judgment items, but also for items measuring disgust sensitivity.
Disgust is often experienced in response to atypical situations or stimuli,
such as unknown or abnormal foods (e.g., insects, chocolate shaped as
dog feces), close contact with strangers, and other unfamiliar situations
(e.g., Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 2004; Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, Dunlop, &
Ashmore, 1999; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986). Disgust in these
situations may be the result of an overgeneralization of our behavioral
immune system. The idea is that in survival terms, it is costlier to risk
contact with infectious pathogens than it is to refrain from eating
harmless foods or to avoid contact with potential cooperators (Haselton
& Nettle, 2006; Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003). When dealing with
situations in which one is vulnerable for pathogen transmission char-
acterized by atypicality, the behavioral immune system thus biases
towards risk avoidance (resulting in a disgust response) as we do not
know whether these weird stimuli carry diseases.
Because many real-life disgust situations are atypical, measures of
disgust sensitivity also include hypothetical situations that are weird;
however, the level of weirdness varies. The frequently used Disgust
Sensitivity Scale (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994) includes scenarios
we find relatively normal (e.g., “I never let any part of my body touch
the toilet seat in public restrooms”), but also scenarios we find sub-
stantially weirder (“I might be willing to try eating monkey meat, under
some circumstances”). Disgust reactions to these weird disgust situa-
tions may be a good predictor of moral judgments of other weird si-
tuations, such as those of the purity domain. Hence, weird disgust
sensitivity items should be more strongly related to moral judgments of
purity transgressions. Put differently, we expect that the relationship
between a disgust sensitivity item and moral judgments of purity
transgressions depends, partly, on how weird that disgust sensitivity
item is.
1.2. Weird or infrequent?
Notably, many situations that elicit disgust are weird in the sense
that they occur infrequently because people are generally motivated to
withdraw from and avoid future contact with potentially contaminating
objects or situations (e.g., Mortensen, Becker, Ackerman, Neuberg, &
Kenrick, 2010; Olatunji, Haidt, McKay, & David, 2008). In line with this
reasoning, one could argue that all disgust sensitivity items character-
ized by infrequency are more strongly related to purity moral judg-
ments. However, this assumes that weirdness and (in)frequency are the
same construct. This is not necessarily the case. Abnormalities can be
the result of deviating from either a statistical norm (i.e., frequency) or
a prescriptive norm (i.e., weirdness; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009). While
frequency refers to how often a behavior occurs, weirdness is the extent
to which a certain behavior breaks conventional rules or departs from
moral or social norms (Chakroff & Young, 2015; Hitchcock & Knobe,
2009) and so refers to the degree to which a behavior is seen as unusual
and unexpected within a given context. (In)Frequency and weirdness
overlap to some degree as behaviors that are considered weird typically
occur infrequently. However, the opposite is not always true. One ex-
ample from a measure of disgust sensitivity is the item, “Sharing an
elevator with a man with a disfigured face” (London Disgust Scale;
Curtis, 2013). Although this situation might not occur frequently in
daily life, our data (below) show that it is not considered to be weird
either. We expect weirdness to be predictive of a disgust sensitivity
item's relationship to purity moral judgments because it is weirdness
(and not frequency) that distinguishes purity moral judgments from
other types of moral judgments (Chakroff & Young, 2015; Gray &
Keeney, 2015; Wagemans et al., 2017).
1.3. Current study
We test two predictions following from the weirdness overlap hy-
pothesis. The first prediction is that weirdness, but not (in)frequency, of
disgust sensitivity items relates positively to the strength of their re-
lationship with moral judgments of purity transgressions. This re-
lationship is expected to be specific to transgressions of the purity do-
main (i.e., weird transgressions). Care moral judgments are used as a
comparison domain that is not characterized by weirdness. The second
prediction is that the stronger relationship between disgust sensitivity
and moral judgments of purity versus care transgressions found in prior
work (e.g., Wagemans et al., 2018) depends on the usage of highly
weird disgust sensitivity items. We test if the relationship between
disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity transgressions dis-
appears when excluding weird disgust sensitivity items from the disgust
sensitivity scale.
2. Method
We collected data on the relationship between disgust sensitivity
items and moral judgments of purity and care transgressions in Sample
1 and combine these with data from an independent second sample




600 MTurkers completed our study in return for a financial reward
($0.70 for 5–7min; 316 males, 282 females, 2 other, Mage= 35.37,
SD=11.25).2
2.1.2. Materials
Participants judged ten purity (α= .89) and ten care (α= .91)
moral transgressions from a standardized set of vignettes based on
Moral Foundations Theory (Clifford, Iyengar, Cabeza, & Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2015). Example items are, respectively, “You see a story
about a remote tribe eating the flesh of their deceased members” and
“You see a woman clearly avoiding sitting next to an obese woman on
the bus”. Participants indicated how immoral they found each behavior
on a scale ranging from 1= ‘Not at all immoral’ to 7= ‘Extremely
immoral’.
Next, participants were randomly assigned to fill out one of three
disgust sensitivity measures: The 32-item Disgust Sensitivity Scale (DSS;
Haidt et al., 1994; N=201, α= .92), the 30-item London Disgust Scale
(LDS; Curtis, 2013; N=199, α= .94), and the 21-item Three Domain
Disgust Scale (TDDS; Tybur et al., 2009; N=200, α= .91). Example
items for the DSS and LDS are, respectively, “You see maggots on a
piece of meat in an outdoor garbage pail,” and “Watching a woman pick
her nose.” The TDDS has three very distinct subscales; pathogen, sexual,
and moral disgust. Example items are, respectively, “Standing close to a
person who has body odor,” “Finding out that someone you don't like
has sexual fantasies about you,” and “Deceiving a friend.” Items of all
scales were measured on a 7-point scale. Anchor labels for the first 17
1 Replication materials, data, and syntax are in the Supplemental Materials at
the Open Science Framework.
2 Another 199 participants completed the Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity
Scale (Van Overveld, de Jong, Peters, Cavanagh, & Davey, 2006). We excluded
this scale in this study, because it focuses on introspection (e.g., “I find some-
thing disgusting”) instead of hypothetical scenarios.
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items of the DSS were 1= ‘Strongly disagree (very untrue about me)’
and 7= ‘Strongly agree (very true about me)’. For the remaining 15
items of the DSS and all items of the TDDS and LDS these were 1= ‘Not
at all disgusting’ and 7 ‘Extremely disgusting’.
2.2. Sample 2
2.2.1. Participants
205 MTurkers completed the study in return for a financial reward
($0.70 for 5–7min; 139 males, 65 females, 1 other, Mage= 33.78,
SD=9.77).
2.2.2. Materials
The 83 items of the abovementioned disgust sensitivity scales were
divided into two sets (of 41 and 42 items) and each participant was
randomly assigned to provide weirdness and frequency ratings of one of
these sets (with item order randomized). Weirdness and frequency were
assessed with “Please indicate how weird (i.e., unusual, bizarre, odd)
you find these situations” and “Please indicate how frequently (i.e.,
typical or common) these situations occur in everyday life.” Answers
were given on a 7-point scale ranging from 1= “Not at all weird [fre-
quent]” to 7= “Extremely weird [frequent].” Reliabilities of these
ratings were for weirdness ICCset1= .34 and ICCset2= .42, both p's <
.001, and for frequency ICCset1= .35 and ICCset1= .32, both p's <
.001.
3. Results
The analyses proceed in three steps. First, in Sample 1, we replicate
the finding we aim to explain, that disgust sensitivity is more strongly
related to moral judgments of purity than care transgressions
(Wagemans et al., 2018). Second, we combine the data from Sample 1
and 2 to investigate whether disgust sensitivity items' weirdness and
frequency ratings predict their relationship to moral judgments of
purity and care transgressions. Third, we re-analyze the Sample 1 data
by testing disgust sensitivity's relationship to moral judgments of purity
and care transgressions separately for highly weird and more normal
disgust sensitivity items.
3.1. Disgust sensitivity and moral domain interaction
Linear mixed-effects models were used to test whether the data of
Sample 1 replicate the finding that disgust sensitivity is more strongly
related to moral judgments of purity than care transgressions, using the
“lmer” function in the “lme4” and “lmerTest” packages of R (Bates,
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015; Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, &
Christensen, 2013). Confidence intervals were obtained using the
“confint” function in the “stats” package using Monte Carlo simulations
with 1000 bootstrap samples (R Core Team, 2017). All models take
random variance of participants and moral judgment items into ac-
count. For the TDDS, analyses were conducted for each subscale sepa-
rately, as is often the case with this scale (e.g., Park, Van Leeuwen, &
Stephen, 2012; Tybur, Merriman, Caldwell Hooper, McDonald, &
Navarrete, 2010). There is substantial overlap between its moral disgust
subscale and transgressions of the care domain, which makes it more
likely that this subscale shows the reversed pattern: A stronger re-
lationship to moral judgments of care, as compared to purity, trans-
gressions.
A model including disgust sensitivity (mean-centered), moral do-
main (1= purity, 0= care), and their interaction revealed an interac-
tion effect of disgust sensitivity and moral domain on moral judgments
for each of the disgust sensitivity (sub)scales. The coefficients for the
interaction effects and their confidence intervals are presented in Fig. 1.
As expected, the DSS, the LDS, and the pathogen and sexual disgust
subscales of the TDDS replicate the finding that disgust sensitivity is
more strongly related to moral judgments of purity (DSS: b=0.74,
SE=0.08, p < .001; LDS: b=0.47, SE=0.08, p < .001; TDDS-Pa-
thogen: b=0.43 SE=0.07, p < .001, TDDS-Sexual: b=0.36,
SE=0.05, p < .001) than care transgressions (DSS: b=0.50,
SE=0.08, p < 001; LDS: b=0.20, SE=0.08, p= .02; TDDS-Pa-
thogen: b=0.22, SE=0.07, p= .002, TDDS-Sexual: b=0.22,
SE=0.05, p < .001). Although marginally significant (p= .0504), the
moral disgust subscale of the TDDS followed the expected reversed
pattern, with a stronger relationship between moral disgust sensitivity
and moral judgments of care (b=0.32, SE=0.04, p < .001), as
compared to purity (b=0.21, SE=0.05, p < .001).
3.2. Weirdness and frequency of disgust sensitivity items
Next, we tested the weirdness overlap hypothesis that disgust sen-
sitivity's relationship with moral judgments of the purity domain can be
predicted by the weirdness of a disgust sensitivity item. We used the
data of Sample 1 to calculate the correlations of each disgust sensitivity
item with moral judgments of purity and care transgressions. These
correlation coefficients were then matched with each disgust sensitivity
item's average weirdness and frequency scores from Sample 2. The
‘cor.test’ function in the ‘stats’ package of R (R Core Team, 2017) was
used to calculate the correlations between weirdness and frequency of a
disgust sensitivity item (estimated in Sample 2) and the correlation of
that item with moral judgments of purity and care transgressions (es-
timated in Sample 1). This resulted in a database with 85 observations
on four variables.
Consistent with the weirdness overlap hypothesis, there was a sig-
nificant correlation between the weirdness of disgust sensitivity items
and the strength of their relationship to purity moral judgments (r
[83]= .36, p < .001, Fig. 2, Top-Left Panel). The weirder a disgust
sensitivity item is, the stronger that item's relationship is to moral
judgments of purity transgressions. As expected, this relationship is
specific to the purity domain, as no relationship was found between
weirdness of disgust sensitivity items and the strength of their re-
lationship to moral judgments of care transgressions (r[83]=−.02,
p= .87, Fig. 2, Bottom-Left Panel). Conducting the same analyses for
frequency of occurrence did not yield any substantive results. A disgust
sensitivity item's frequency was not correlated with the strength of its
relationship to moral judgments of purity (r[83]=−.11, p= .32,
Fig. 2, Top-Right Panel), nor care (r[83]=−.03, p= .81, Fig. 2,
Bottom-Right Panel) transgressions.
3.3. Reanalysis of disgust sensitivity and moral domain interaction
Are there consequences for including weird items in disgust sensi-
tivity measures? We investigated this by testing whether the interaction
between disgust sensitivity and moral domain depends on the inclusion
of weird disgust sensitivity items. We re-analyzed the data from Sample
1 separately for disgust sensitivity items scoring below and above the
median weirdness rating (i.e., 3.38) and compared the findings.
A model including disgust sensitivity (measured with items scoring
high or low on weirdness; mean-centered), moral domain (1= purity,
0= care), and their interaction was fit to the dataset of each (sub)scale.
An interesting pattern emerged (see Fig. 1). For the DSS, the LDS, and
the pathogen subscale of the TDDS, the interaction between disgust
sensitivity and moral domain tended to be slightly stronger when dis-
gust sensitivity was measured with disgust sensitivity items scoring
high, as compared to low, on weirdness. However, these differences
were quite small and well within the confidence intervals of the other
estimates.
We conducted z-tests to test whether these interaction effects dif-
fered in magnitude for disgust sensitivity items scoring high and low on
weirdness. For all but one sub(scale) no significant differences were
found (all z's < 0.88, all p's > .38). A significant difference was found
for the sexual disgust subscale of the TDDS (z=2.15, p= .03), but this
was in the opposite direction of what was expected by the weirdness
F.M.A. Wagemans et al. Personality and Individual Differences 146 (2019) 182–187
184
overlap hypothesis. Rather than becoming stronger and more positive,
the interaction effect became non-significantly negative for weirder
items. That is, although at an item level the weirdness of disgust sen-
sitivity items may affect the size of the disgust sensitivity-purity judg-
ment association (consistent with the weirdness overlap hypothesis),
when used as a combined scale the effects of disgust sensitivity
weirdness do not affect conclusions about the link between disgust
sensitivity and moral judgments (inconsistent with the weirdness
overlap hypothesis).
4. Discussion
Purity moral transgressions are substantially weirder than other
types of moral transgressions, suggesting that weirdness might account
for the disgust-purity link (Gray & Keeney, 2015). We tested a
“weirdness overlap” hypothesis, which predicts that the weirdness of
disgust sensitivity items predicts the strength of their relationship to
moral judgments of purity (i.e., weird) transgressions. The results of our
study support that prediction and show that the relationship is specific
to the moral domain of purity (i.e., weird transgressions). Importantly,
however, we find no evidence that the inclusion of weird disgust sen-
sitivity items explains the interaction between disgust sensitivity and
domain on moral judgments.
As expected, many of the disgust sensitivity items occurred rela-
tively infrequently (Mfrequency= 2.37, SD=0.86, median= 2.21), but
were not necessarily perceived to be weird (Mweirdness = 3.67,
SD=1.13, median= 3.38). Even though the two constructs were
highly correlated (r[83]=−.80, p < .001), they showed two distinct
patterns of results. While disgust sensitivity items' weirdness ratings
had a moderately strong correlation with the strength of items' re-
lationship to moral judgments of purity transgressions, there was no
such relationship for disgust sensitivity items' frequency of occurrence.
This suggests that there is conceptual utility in distinguishing between
weirdness and (in)frequency, and that additional work should in-
vestigate the conceptual and causal relationships between disgust and
weirdness.
We tested the “weirdness overlap” hypothesis on the level of items.
One limitation of this approach is that we treat an item's weirdness and
frequency score as a constant factor, which might not be the case. The
relatively low ICC's (i.e., between .32 and .42) suggest that individuals
do not fully agree which items are weird/occur frequently and this
measurement error negatively affects the precision of our results and
also reduces the statistical power of our study. It is possible that there
are individual differences in perceptions of weirdness and frequency,
which future research could test by using a fully within-subjects design.
For example, it could be that some individuals are more sensitive to
weird situations in general, and because of that sensitivity react more
negatively to both weird disgust sensitivity items (i.e., with more dis-
gust) and weird moral judgment items (i.e., with more moral con-
demnation). However, while this logic explains why disgust sensitivity
relates to moral judgments in general, it cannot explain why disgust
sensitivity has a stronger relationship to moral judgments of purity
specifically. In other words, it is not exactly clear why such weirdness
sensitive individuals would react differently to variation in weirdness of
purity and other types of transgressions.
Additionally, we want to note the potential importance of cultural
norms on perceptions of weirdness and frequency. What may be weird
or occur infrequently in one culture, might be relatively normal or even
norm-abiding in another culture (e.g., the item “You are served a dish
made of cow's tongue and cheek”). In our study, we used the Amazon
Mechanical Turk (i.e., MTurk) platform to recruit an American sample
because previous research on the relationship between disgust sensi-
tivity and moral judgments and on the weirdness of purity transgres-
sions has also mostly used American subjects. However, it should be
noted that MTurk workers are not an exact representation of the general
American population as the sample is self-selected (see Paolacci &
Chandler, 2014). This self-selection bias results, for example, in MTurk
samples that are relatively young, educated, and liberal (Berinsky,
Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Huff & Tingley, 2015). These, and other, differ-
ences between MTurk workers and the general American population
could affect our findings3 and it thus remains to be tested whether our
findings hold in other samples, including more representative American
samples.
5. Conclusion
We reasoned that the often found link between disgust sensitivity
TDDS   Moral disgust
TDDS − Sexual disgust
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Fig. 1. Unstandardized regression coefficients of the in-
teraction between disgust sensitivity and moral domain
(purity= 1, care= 0) on moral judgments for each dis-
gust sensitivity scale, including the full scale, high
weirdness items, and low weirdness items. Positive
coefficients indicate a stronger relationship to moral
judgments of purity than care transgressions.
3 In our study, age and education level did not predict weirdness or frequency
ratings. Political ideology was associated with weirdness, but not frequency
ratings. However, using conservatives' or liberals' mean weirdness ratings does
not affect our conclusions. See Supplemental Materials for more information.
F.M.A. Wagemans et al. Personality and Individual Differences 146 (2019) 182–187
185
and purity issues might be explained by a shared characteristic of items
measuring these constructs: Weirdness. We only find partial evidence
for this weirdness overlap hypothesis and have to conclude that the
stronger relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments
of the purity domain is unlikely to be due to weirdness overlap. In
contrast to earlier suggestions that weirdness is a confound (Gray &
Keeney, 2015), it seems that weirdness is a meaningful factor in each of
these constructs. Future work will be necessary to determine if weird-
ness is one of the features distinguishing purity from other types of
moral transgressions (also see Graham, 2015; Sabo & Giner-Sorolla,
2017) and if weirdness might induce disgust when combined with a
possibility for pathogen transmission (i.e., when weirdness equals an
uncertain and risky situation).
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